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Abstract
Reviewing past experience with in-country processing in
Haiti and its links to American interdiction policies, as
well as the history of Cuban migration to the United
States, this paper argues against in-country processing for
Haitian refugees. The paper asserts that in-country proc-
essing in Haiti in the early 1990s was a failure, and argu-
ably was used as a justification for returning to
persecution far more people than it saved. The very exist-
ence of a small aperture through which relatively few se-
lected individuals will be able to pass for legal admission
to the United States is likely to erode the rights of many
more Haitian asylum seekers seeking to leave spontane-
ously and, in particular, to serve to rationalize migration
control measures that seriously compromise the funda-
mental principles of refugee law.
Résumé
Après avoir passé en revue l’expérience du passé de traite-
ment sur place à Haïti et ses liens avec les politiques amé-
ricaines d’interdiction, ainsi que les antécédents de
l’immigration cubaine aux États-Unis, cet article s’op-
pose fortement à la politique de traitement sur place des
réfugiés haïtiens. L’article soutient que le traitement sur
place à Haïti au début des années 90 s’est soldé par un
échec, et qu’il est permis de penser que, par la suite, cet
échec a été utilisé comme justification pour renvoyer à la
persécution beaucoup plus de personnes qu’il ne sauva.
L’existence même d’une petite ouverture à travers la-
quelle un nombre relativement restreint d’individus sélec-
tionnés pourra passer pour entrer légalement aux
États-Unis, va très vraisemblablement éroder les droits
d’un plus grand nombre de demandeurs d’asile haïtiens
désireux de quitter le pays spontanément, et, en particu-
lier, va servir à rationaliser des mesures de contrôle à
l’immigration qui portent sérieusement atteinte à l’inté-
grité des principes fondamentaux du droit des réfugiés.
I
n the context of deteriorating human rights conditions
in Haiti and continuing interdiction and summary re-
turn of Haitian boat people, U.S. government agencies
are discussing the possibility of re-initiating refugee process-
ing from within Haiti. Based on past experience with in-
country processing in Haiti as well as on principles of refugee
protection, this paper argues that the existence of an in-
country processing  program might well prevent asylum
seekers who leave Haiti irregularly from having a fair hearing
on their claims while also not providing a viable alternative
for people who are compelled by imminent threats to flee
the country.
On April 11, 2003, government officials met with four
nongovernmental organizations to discuss a wide variety of
concerns relating to the treatment of Haitian refugees, asy-
lum seekers, and immigrants. Officials at that meeting re-
quested a statement from those agencies specifically on
resettlement and processing of Haitian refugees. They sent
that memorandum on June 23, 2003.1 While this paper
respectfully differs with the recommendations in that docu-
ment, the agencies endorsing both that statement and this
share the critique of past and present U.S. government
practices toward Haitian refugees and asylum seekers as
violating their rights. The agencies endorsing this statement
fully support the opening statement in the June 23, 2003,
paper: “The NGOs providing these recommendations are
united in their belief that the United States must comply
with its obligations under both U.S. and international law
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to provide protection to refugees who have a well-founded
fear of persecution.” All concerned NGOs agree that. prac-
tices of the U.S. with respect to Haitian asylum seekers, thus
far, have fallen considerably short of meeting its obligations
under U.S. and international law.
The History of In-Country Processing in Haiti
and Its Link to Interdiction
From its inception, the in-country processing program in
Haiti has been linked to U.S. interdiction policies. On Janu-
ary 31, 1992, the Supreme Court lifted an injunction on the
forced repatriation of interdicted Haitians, and on the fol-
lowing day, February 1, the first Bush administration re-
sumed forcibly repatriating Haitians. In-country processing
began that same month. That was no mere coincidence. This
became clear several months later, on May 24, 1992, when
President George H.W. Bush issued the Kennebunkport
Order, under which all interdicted Haitians would be re-
turned summarily to Haiti without interviews or processing
to determine possible refugee status. At the time of the
announcement, the White House advised would-be refugees
to apply at the U.S. consulate in Port-au-Prince for in-coun-
try refugee processing.
The mere existence of an in-country processing program
was used to justify the new policy of summarily returning
all interdicted Haitians with no screening. Although it was
touted as an alternative to boat departure, the reality at the
time was that only a handful of people were able to avail
themselves of that alternative. Of the 279 Haitians who had
applied since the inception of the program in February
1992, nine had been admitted to the United States by the
end of May, an average of two per month. This rate was
occurring as the Cedras dictatorship was crushing all dis-
sent and while U.S. Coast Guard cutters were returning all
interdicted Haitian asylum seekers.
A June 11, 1992, House hearing examined in-country
processing in Haiti, at which point twelve Haitians had been
admitted to the United States (out of 1,582 applicants).
Then-Representative Stephen J. Solarz said that the Bush
administration’s use of in-country processing to justify
summary return of interdicted Haitians was a “ludicrous
argument.” He said, “In the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam,
and Romania in-country processing has been an alternative
option for those with the inclination, courage, and gump-
tion to use it. But it has never been the exclusive option, and
it  is  clear that making it the exclusive option does not
conform to international law.”
At the same Congressional hearing, Professor Harold
Koh testified that it would be “suicide” for persons in the
situation of Haitian boat people to attempt instead the
in-country processing option. “To pursue this option,” he
said, “the asylee [sic] would have to leave hiding,  pass
numerous security road blocks, enter the heavily milita-
rized capital city of Port-au-Prince, travel to areas sur-
rounding the U.S. Consulate and Embassy that are
especially dangerous given the high concentration of secu-
rity forces, present and identify himself to the Haitian
security forces before entering, subject himself to their
scrutiny, engage in highly adversarial proceedings with U.S.
immigration officials, then repeat the entire process several
times before receiving a final determination on his asylum
request.”
On January 14, 1993, shortly before he was sworn in as
president, President-elect Bill Clinton announced that he
would continue the Bush administration’s interdiction pol-
icy, telling Haitians, “Those who do leave Haiti directly by
boat will be stopped and directly returned by the United
States Coast Guard.” He told Haitians that they had an
alternative. “You can apply from within Haiti, through the
United States embassy in Port-au-Prince.” Shortly after
Clinton’s announcement, the Coast Guard announced Op-
eration Able Manner, surrounding Haiti with twenty-two
U.S. Coast Guard cutters and navy ships, as well as deploy-
ing planes and helicopters for surveillance in order to en-
sure that no boats of Haitian asylum seekers eluded
interdiction.
In fact, it had become even more difficult to pass through
the eye  of  the  in-country-processing needle  than  a  few
months earlier. Between the start of the program in Febru-
ary 1992 and the end of that year, 9,389 cases, representing
15,580, persons had applied for the in-country processing
program in Haiti; 61 cases, 136 people, were admitted to
the United States. The Coast Guard interdicted 37,618
Haitian boat people in Fiscal Year 1992, the overwhelming
majority of whom were summarily repatriated.
1993 was a particularly bad year for Haitian would-be
refugees. Human rights abuses were widespread, yet Hai-
tians had nowhere to flee. In-country processing was not a
viable option for people being hunted down, but the exist-
ence of what on paper appeared to be an alternative justified
summary interdiction and return. The hopelessness of boat
escape was demonstrated by the precipitous drop in Haitian
interdictions from the nearly 37,618 in FY 1992 to 4,270 in
FY 1993, almost all of whom were summarily returned.
Although  the number of persons admitted  through in-
country processing rose in FY 1993 to 1,307, relative to the
growing number of applicants the number admitted was
paltry and amounted to little more than false hope for most.
Nevertheless, the State Department reported to Congress
that year that “refugee questionnaires were placed on U.S.
Coast Guard cutters engaged in interdiction operations so
that repatriated boat people would be made aware of the
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U.S. program and those with strong refugee claims could
be brought quickly into the refugee processing program.”2
With the failure of the Governors Island Agreement in
October 1993, human rights conditions inside Haiti plum-
meted further. With the possibility of finding asylum
through boat departure cut off, up to 800 persons a day
began applying for in-country processing. This mecha-
nism, slow moving at best, became completely over-
whelmed by the numbers.
By May 1994, in-country processing had proven to be a
complete sham—a smokescreen for refoulement. At that
point, 54,219 applications had been filed representing
nearly 106,000 people; only 10,644 cases had been decided,
of which 9,827 had been denied, an approval rate of 7.7
percent of cases decided. But most cases never got as far as
an interview with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). The procedure required at least four separate
interviews for screening and refugee status determination
followed by additional visits for medical clearances, spon-
sorship assurances, issuance of Haitian passports and U.S.
travel documents, and other travel arrangements. All visits
required the applicants to wait at locked gates and pass
various security guards. The Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes
processing offices were located in close proximity to large
military and police facilities. Although accommodations
were made to permit INS-approved Haitians to leave the
country without being required to approach the Haitian
authorities for a Haitian passport, many of the most vul-
nerable people never applied for the in-country procedure
for fear that doing so would expose them to danger, especially
since many thought they would be required to approach the
very authorities they feared to get passports. A total of 3,766
Haitians were admittedas refugees in FY 1994, which included
cases adjudicated during the previous two years, but whose
exit was delayed by the cumbersome process.
Screening Standards Higher for Haitians
The in-country screening standard was significantly higher
than the international refugee standard of a well-founded
fear of persecution. Starting in May 1994, interviews were
granted only to applicants who met one of five criteria: (1)
senior and mid-level Aristide officials; (2) close Aristide
associates; (3) journalists or educational activists who had
experienced significant and persistent harassment; (4) high-
profile members of political and social organizations who
had experienced significant and persistent harassment; or
(5) others of compelling concern to the United States and in
immediate danger.3
The criteria essentially required membership in a seg-
ment of the Haitian elite as well as a showing of significant
and persistent harassment. Poor people, who bore the
brunt of the Cedras regime’s repression and who over-
whelmingly constituted the ranks of the boat people, had
virtually no chance. A U.S. embassy official involved in
in-country processing said in an April 1994 interview, “We
decide who gets placed into line [for an INS interview] and
how to move cases that are INS-approved. If you are in a
neighborhood that has been victimized en masse, you will
not have a chance under U.S. law. You need to show indi-
vidual targeting.” In effect, applicants from  neighbour-
hoods being victimized en masse, such as Cité Soleil, where
individualized targeting was, in fact, occurring were ex-
cluded from the program. The same month, an NGO case-
worker who screened cases for the INS said, “The person
would at least have to have been arrested once to get an INS
interview.”4 This clearly indicates a standard not required
to establish refugee status under international law, which is
based on a well-founded fear of future persecution, not
necessarily based on a showing of past persecution.
The bias against non-elites went beyond the standards
for screening applicants and adjudicating claims. It was
based on capacity to travel and on having a mailing address,
a place of residence, and, implicitly, literacy in a country
with a high illiteracy rate.
The in-country processing program also, most impor-
tantly, required—ironically and perversely—that the appli-
cant’s fear of persecution couldn’t be so high that he or she
would be afraid to be seen standing in line outside the
processing locations or that he or she was unable wait for
the prolonged process to conclude.
In-country processing couldn’t provide safety for appli-
cants during the slow  and  highly visible procedure. As
human rights conditions in Haiti deteriorated this became
more and more obvious. On July 27, 1994, when commer-
cial flights out of Haiti were cancelled, 1,857 INS-approved
refugees were left stranded. Subsequently, the nongovern-
mental agencies pre-screening cases for the INS in Les
Cayes and Cap Haitien stopped interviewing new cases,
saying that there was no way to evacuate persons approved
as refugees for U.S. admission. On August 1, 1994, Haitian
police and paramilitary forces attacked a line of applicants
waiting for refugee processing where pre-screening was still
occurring in Port-au-Prince, beating and arresting a
number of the applicants.
Now and Then
There is no reason to believe that many of these same
problems would not recur if in-country processing were
re-established in Haiti today. Given conditions in Haiti and
available resources for such a program, would truly vulner-
able Haitians have any better access to in-country processing
now than they did then? Under conditions of appalling
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economic misery, endemic corruption and mismanage-
ment, and uncontrolled political violence, would applicants
be able to gain access to the program or expose themselves
to additional risk while their claims were pending? A
recent report by the National Coalition for Haitian Rights
suggests that dissidents are subject to attack not only at
the hands of so-called popular organizations, but also a
corrupt and politicized police force. The September 2003
report observes:
Most notably, the numbers of attacks, acts of intimidation and
outright assassinations against members of the opposition, hu-
man rights  organizations and independent journalists have
amplified in comparison to the late 1990s. Alarmingly, mem-
bers of the national police force as well as so-called popular
organizations (OPs) close to the government have been linked
directly to many such violations that have contributed to the
decline for respect for human right in general.5
An additional problem that in-country processing would
face in 2003 that it did not confront in the 1992–94 period
is the role of the home government. In 1992–94, the U.S.
government did not recognize the Cedras regime, and pro-
ceeded with in-country processing without the cooperation
of that government. However, in cases where the U.S. gov-
ernment does recognize the government of the home coun-
try, as it does in 2003 with the Aristide regime, it would be
bound to seek the co-operation of that government in the
in-country processing procedure, particularly in the issu-
ance of passports or other travel documents. In this respect,
in-country processing would be more problematic in 2003
than it was in 1994 with respect to fundamental refugee
protection principles—i.e., it would compel a person who
fears persecution at the hands of his or her government to
approach that same government for permission to seek
asylum from it.
Most importantly, in the event of a renewed mass exodus
of Haitian boat people, would the mere existence of an
in-country processing program, no matter how flawed or
limited it might be, be used as a rationale for returning
Haitians back to the place of persecution?
Violation of Fundamental Principles of Refugee
Law
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention forbids the return of a
refugee to a place where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened—the principle of non-refoulement. The U.S. asylum
system within the territory of the United States is built on
this foundation—on the mandatory bar preventing govern-
ments from returning refugees to persecution, and on the
corollary principle that a person so protected generally
ought to have a status (asylum) which can lead to permanent
protection in the form of citizenship. Yet this principle is
openly violated by U.S. interdiction practices and was more
subtly undermined by in-country processing in Haiti.
The international law bar on refoulement is absolute; but
U.S. interdiction practice makes it discretionary. President
George H.W. Bush’s Kennebunkport Order, which author-
ized the United States to stop and board vessels on the high
seas and to return their passengers to their countries of
origin, added that “the Attorney General, in his unreview-
able discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee
will not be returned without his consent.” (Emphasis
added.) The President does not hold the Attorney General
to the 1951 Refugee Convention’s command not to “expel
or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the  frontiers of territories where  his life or freedom
would be threatened.”
Overseas refugee resettlement is not built on the founda-
tion of non-refoulement at all. It is completely discretionary
because resettlement is about admission, not removal. Be-
cause refugee admissions are completely discretionary, the
U.S. government is under no legal obligation to admit any
refugees from abroad, and it has wide latitude to determine
which refugees are of “special humanitarian concern” to it
sufficient to admit them as refugees.
Accordingly, U.S. officials in Haiti would not be required
to admit every Haitian who approached its in-country
processing centers with a well-founded fear of persecution.
As it did in the early 1990s, U.S. officials could choose
whom and how many it wished to take. It would be com-
pelled to take not a single would-be refugee, no matter how
strong his or her claim. As it did in the early 1990s, the U.S.
government could create almost insurmountable vetting
criteria that go well beyond the legal refugee definition and
the regulations that govern asylum adjudication within the
United States.
A discretionary refugee admissions program, therefore,
does not come close to meeting international legal require-
ments to protect refugees. In-country programs are even
more problematic. Since the applicant is already inside his
or her home country, he cannot actually be a refugee at all
at the time of applying for refugee status, and, logically, his
denial cannot be called refoulement since he or she cannot
be returned to a place where he or she is already present.
In-country processing linked to interdiction is the most
dangerous combination of all. Haitian in-country process-
ing in the 1990s—established to operate in conjunction
with interdiction and summary return—was designed to
create an exclusive track for Haitians seeking protection
from persecution. This is particularly offensive to interna-
tional refugee protection principles. Ordinarily, U.S. asy-
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lum adjudicators regard asylum seekers as having aban-
doned their claims if they opt for voluntary repatriation.
The interdiction-and-return-to-in-country-processing
scheme, however, is predicated on requiring repatriation in
order to seek protection from that country. Where in-coun-
try processing programs are, in effect, designed as the only
avenue for seeking protection, as they were for Haitiansduring
key periods of the Cedras dictatorship, they are not just prob-
lematic, but manifestly harmful.
Cuban In-Country Processing and Migration
Controls
The practical realities also make it clear that in-country
processing has intrinsic limitations as a mechanism to pro-
tect people fleeing persecution at the hands of their own
government. Long before in-country processing started for
Haitians, Ricardo Inzunza, the deputy commissioner of the
INS in the first Bush Administration, wrote in a 1990 law
review article about the limitations of in-country processing
in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam. “Unfortunately, in
most cases, those most in need of this remedy—those most
vulnerable to abuses and with least access to any viable
alternative—are least likely to be able to take advantage of
it. Those in active flight are unlikely to get into the U.S.
embassy, or even to it, without being noticed and/or ar-
rested…. It is slow and many persons with a ‘well-founded
fear of persecution’ simply cannot wait for such processing
to be completed.”6
Whatever the value of in-country processing in Russia,
Vietnam,  or  Cuba as  a mechanism for rescuing people
threatened with persecution while still living in their home
countries, it ought, at best, to be considered as complemen-
tary to the right to seek asylum outside the country by other
means, and not as a substitute for the right to seek asylum
as embodied in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The scope of this paper does not permit an
exhaustive examination of in-country processing in Russia
and Vietnam and an analysis of whether or not it compro-
mised the right to seek asylum (certainly the intent in
creating the Orderly Departure Program out of Vietnam
was to create an alternative to boat departures, but the
existence of the program does not appear to have been used
as a justification for summarily returning Vietnamese boat
people to Vietnam), but because of the geographical simi-
larities of Cuba and Haiti as Caribbean island nations and
their proximity to the United States as a country of first
asylum, it is worth examining in some detail in-country
processing in Cuba and its links to migration-control meas-
ures.
The history of Cuban migration to the United States
demonstrates the unique standing of Cubans in U.S. immi-
gration and refugee policy as exiles from the only Commu-
nist country in the Western Hemisphere. Spontaneous
waves of refugees ebbed and flowed between the 1959 Cu-
ban Revolution and 1965, but boat departures escalated
sharply in October 1965 when President Lyndon Johnson
gave a speech at the foot of the Statue of Liberty welcoming
all Cubans “who seek freedom” to the United States. Cuban
President Fidel Castro opened up Camarioca harbour, al-
lowing a flotilla of boats to leave. The large and unmanaged
migration flow prompted the United States to negotiate a
migration agreement with Cuba in late 1965 that estab-
lished criteria for determining which Cubans might board
daily flights from Havana to Miami. The 1965 Memoran-
dum of Understanding excluded all political prisoners and
all draft-age men from the flights. Therefore, what became
the largest “in-country processing” program in U.S. his-
tory—the Freedom Flights of the 1960s that brought more
than 700,000 Cubans directly to the United States from
1965 until they were halted by Fidel Castro in 1973—was
designed to exclude the most vulnerable people at highest
risk of persecution. Testifying before a Congressional hear-
ing in 1979 about those who arrived on the Freedom Flights
of the 1960s, Virginia Dominguez said, “Many of those who
came after 1965 were housewives and children, and were
not actively political. They were not necessarily poor, or the
victims of political persecution.”
The cut-off of managed migration in 1973 again resulted
in Cubans fleeing  the island  by  raft  and  boat  with the
encouragement of the U.S. government, culminating in
President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 welcome of Cuban boat
people “with an open heart and open arms” that resulted in
a mass influx of more than 125,000 from the harbour of
Mariel that summer. The presence of some criminals and
mental patients among the other “Marielitos” and their
sudden, massive, and disorganized arrival caused a sharper
backlash than had occurred in 1965. On September 29,
1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Presidential Procla-
mation 4865, which authorized the high seas interdiction
of boats carrying suspected undocumented migrants to the
United States. Cuban migration slowed considerably dur-
ing the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.
Between 1982 and 1992, the Coast Guard interdicted 5,311
Cubans, an average of about 480 per year, but brought them
to the United States. They were paroled into the United
States, and under the terms of the Cuban Adjustment Act
of 1966 were generally able to adjust to permanent resident
status after staying for one year. In-country refugee proc-
essing from Cuba began in 1987, but was a relatively modest
program admitting an average of 2,261 per year from 1988
through 1992.
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U.S. migration policy toward Cubans shifted dramati-
cally during the Clinton administration, a time of massive
upsurge in boat and raft departures. For the first time, the
United States initiated a policy of interdiction and return
of Haitians, and explicitly linked that policy to the existence
of in-country processing. On May 2, 1995, the Clinton
administration announced that  the Coast Guard  would
interdict Cuban rafts and boats, hold abbreviated ship-
board screening, and repatriate screened-out Cubans. In
language reminiscent of Clinton’s first announcement of
his Haitian interdiction policy, Attorney General Janet
Reno accompanied the new Cuban interdiction and return
policy by saying, “effective immediately, Cuban migrants
intercepted at sea attempting to enter the United States, or
who enter Guantanamo illegally, will be taken to Cuba,
where U.S. consular officers will assist those who wish to
apply to come to the United States through already estab-
lished mechanisms. Cubans must know that the only way
to come to the United States is by applying in Cuba.”
Reno’s announcement, particularly the last sentence
quoted, demonstrated a breathtaking disregard for funda-
mental refugee principles. To suggest that persons who
have fled persecution should return to the very country
where they fear persecution as the only avenue to seek
protection from that persecution is absurd. Yet that became
official policy.
Later that year, the INS issued written guidance to its
officers going on shipboard detail in the Florida Straits
instructing them how to implement this policy. Essentially
the same statement is read to Cubans interdicted today.
Then, as now, they are directed to read the following state-
ment: “You are being taken back to Cuba. You will not be
taken to the United States.” It is not specified whether the
ships carrying the interdicted Cubans are already traveling
back to Cuba as INS (now Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, or DHS) assessments of the Cubans are taking place,
but the opening sentence tells the Cubans this is the case, and
suggests to them a certain inevitability about the process.
The Cubans are next told: “U.S. government officials in
Havana will meet the ship and will provide information to
you if you wish to apply to go to the United States through
established migration programs.” Then the Cubans are
assured that it is safe for them to go back to Cuba. The
statement reads: “The government of Cuba has provided a
commitment to the United States that you will suffer no
adverse consequences or reprisals of any sort for illegal
departure or for making application for legal migration to
the United States at the U.S. Interests Section.” They are
then, again, reminded that “only those people who are
approved by the U.S. Interests Section in Havana can be
assured of entry to the United States.”
The statement tells the Cubans only that the  Cuban
government has agreed that Cubans will not suffer adverse
consequences for illegal departure or for applying at the
U.S. Interests Section; it is silent about Cuba’s lack of
assurances about other adverse consequences for political
dissent or other underlying reasons for fleeing the country.
The statement closes with an ambiguous invitation to
come forward with any concern about returning to Cuba.
The word actually used in the Spanish announcement is
asunto, which more accurately translates as “matter” rather
than “concern” as written in the official English text of the
statement.7 Although the interdicted Cubans are told that
their asunto will be treated confidentially, the instruction to
the INS officers only advises them to keep these interviews
private and confidential “to the extent possible.”
If a Cuban takes the initiative of approaching the INS
officer, the memorandum instructs the officer to “arrange
a meeting with that person.” The odd choice of wording is
specifically to avoid use of the terms “pre-screening” or
“screening.” In the meeting, INS officers are instructed to
ask the Cubans whether they are aware of refugee process-
ing at the U.S. Interests Section. If the Cuban persists in
expressing a fear of return, the officer is instructed to apply
a “credible fear of persecution standard.” However, the
instruction goes on to direct the officer: “In evaluating the
objective basis for a person’s fear under the credible fear
standard in this program, you should consider the formal
assurances made by the Cuban Government to the U.S.
Government that no Cuban migrant will suffer adverse
consequences or reprisals of any sort for irregular departure
or for applying for refugee status, the monitoring of Cubans
returned under this program by officials from the U.S.
Interests Section, and the existence of an in-country proc-
essing program.”
The INS guidance requires its shipboard officers to per-
form two mutually exclusive functions: first, to conduct a
sales pitch for in-country processing to convince the Cuban
that it is safe to return; then, to act as an adjudicator to
determine whether the same person has a credible fear of
return. Directing the adjudicator to tell the applicant that it is
safe to return hopelessly prejudices any such adjudication.
The United States concluded a migration agreement with
Cuba in September 1994 whereby the United States agreed
to admit 20,000 immigrants per year and Cuba agreed to
prevent unauthorized boat departures. The agreement on
its face put the U.S. government in the position of demand-
ing that the Cuban government violate Article 13 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees
everyone the right to leave his or her own country. The
September 9, 1994, agreement said that Cuba would “take
effective measures in every way it possibly can to prevent
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unsafe departures using mainly persuasive methods.” The
language of taking measures “every way it possibly can,”
and explicitly not limited to persuasive methods, is chilling.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael M. Skol, the
chief U.S. negotiator in the talks, told the press, “We expect
a dramatic reduction in departures.”
Conclusion
The agencies endorsing this statement support a generous
immigration policy for Haitians provided there is no quid
pro quo that requires the Haitian government to prevent its
citizens from leaving the country in violation of interna-
tional human rights principles.
The agencies supporting this statement also encourage
the U.S. government to consider Haitian refugee processing
from first-asylum countries in the region, including the
Dominican Republic and the Bahamas.
The agencies supporting this statement remain funda-
mentally opposed to  past and current U.S. interdiction
practices  because they  do  not afford asylum seekers an
opportunity for fair hearings of their refugee claims, and
because the U.S. government through the interdiction pro-
gram does not recognize its obligations under Article 33 of
the 1951 Refugee Convention.
For the same reasons that in-country processing in Haiti
in the early 1990s was a failure, and arguably was used as a
justification for returning to persecution far more people
than it saved, in-country processing should not now be
regarded as representing a genuine mechanism of protec-
tion for Haitians actively fearful of being persecuted. The
very existence of a small aperture through which only a
relatively few selected individuals will be able to pass for
legal admission to the United States under the U.S. refugee
admissions program is too likely to erode the rights of many
more Haitian asylum seekers seeking to leave spontane-
ously and, in particular, to serve to rationalize migration
control measures that seriously compromise the right to
seek asylum itself.
This statement has been endorsed by the following nongovern-
mental organizations:
Amnesty International USA
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
TransAfrica Forum
Immigration and Refugee Services of America/
U.S. Committee for Refugees
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